Introduction
Governed, designed and funded by the three central be a particularly useful data set -a data set the whole of which is greater than the sum of its parts in that it reveals both enduring and emerging trends about contemporary public management in New Zealand.
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The article is organised into four parts. It moves from the general to the specific and then back to the general. Part one orientates the reader by introducing the PIF to those who are unfamiliar with it. It covers what the PIF is, why it was introduced, and some of the early benefits, as well as the intervention logic at the heart of the PIF programme. The following section explores the difficulties and technical hitches in aggregating the PIF agency data. This is followed by an attempt to find trends and patterns in the metadata and translate them into useful information -both to provoke debate and reconfirm a few lessons. Finally, the article offers an insight into how PIF system analysis provides support for the areas identified by the Better Public Services Advisory Group, and the actions being taken to address them.
What is the Performance Improvement

Framework?
The term PIF refers to a review as well as to the model or framework. Essentially, it is a review of an agency's fitness for purpose today and for the future. Using the PIF agency model, a PIF review looks at the current state of an agency and how well placed it is to deal with the issues that confront it in the mediumterm future. The PIF agency model was designed by the central agencies and chief executives from across the state services. Unlike the public service improvement models in the United Kingdom and Australia, it covers both results and organisational management. It has six critical areas, supported by 17 elements and 28 lead questions. The lead questions are supported by 88 lines of enquiry. Unlike the rating system in the United Kingdom, Australia and South Africa, it rewards sustained results, stewardship and continuous improvement.
A PIF review is done in two ways. The first is a formal review. Like in Australia, but unlike in Canada, the UK and South Africa, a formal review is conducted by independent experts. Called PIF lead reviewers, these experts review an agency's capability, performance and ability to deliver on government priorities, its core business and a range of organisational management elements, using the PIF agency model. This review is largely ex post. New Zealand is the only jurisdiction which then takes an ex ante position by asking two critical questions and inviting the agency to respond: Many agencies in the wider public sector are not eligible for a formal review. Those agencies use the PIF agency model as a self-review tool to measure and improve their own performances. This is the second way a PIF review is done. Selfreview workshops are conducted every quarter. These workshops are always oversubscribed.
To ensure an agency realises the benefit of a formal review, the PIF followup review has been launched. It is a recent innovation, designed originally by Land Information New Zealand and the Department of Conservation. The followup review occurs 12-18 months after a formal review. It is conducted by the PIF lead reviewers, but is largely led by the chief executive and the senior leaders in the agency. While it does not have ratings, the follow-up review is published. It is designed to ensure that each agency has an opportunity to take stock, make sure that it is realising the benefits of the most recent PIF review, and is still well placed to deal with the future challenges. Three follow-up reviews have been completed. These provide ministers and the public with assurance that the agencies involved are continuously seeking to improve and that their journey is transparent.
Why was PIF introduced?
When Iain Rennie became the State Services Commissioner in 2008 he was concerned that the public service was not perceived as taking ownership of its own performance improvement. He noted that there were plenty of reports from external agencies and lobby groups, and these were often critical of the public service. Many of them, he felt, did not recognise the real strength of the public service, and equally he wanted to move the culture of the public service towards continuous improvement and innovation (State Services Commission, 2012a In addition, ministers get assurance that the agencies they are responsible for are constantly looking to improve how they do business and deliver value for the taxpayers' investment in them. Ministers also get independent assurance, as the PIF formal reviews are undertaken by external expert parties. Finally, and probably most importantly, the public is able to see that the state services are on the move and are serious about the services they deliver and how these are delivered: the public can see that the state services are continuously seeking to improve and are transparent about that journey.
What is the intervention logic?
At the heart of the PIF is the intervention logic (and design assumption) that an ethical and impartial state service is fundamental to maintaining trust, but integrity and impartiality, while necessary, are not sufficient to maintain confidence in New Zealand's public institutions (State Services Commission, 2011a). Public institutions need to deliver -they need to perform -and they need to demonstrate to citizens that they take performance improvement seriously. The value of PIF is that it was designed to support public institutions to improve and demonstrate a commitment to performance improvement.
PIF system analysis: difficulties and technical hitches
So, what role does the PIF play in enabling a high-integrity and high-performing state sector? After being redesigned over the past 12 months, PIF is now a method for systematically identifying the extent to which an agency understands its role and purpose and determining how it is led, managed and resourced (State Services Commission, 2012d). Three years ago it was simply an organisational diagnostic tool; now it is a process designed specifically for the New Zealand state services to ensure chief executives and senior leaders have well-developed views on the most important issues facing New Zealand, what it will take for their particular agency or sector to address those issues, and the role each agency and sector can and should play.
How does the PIF system analysis now under-way in the central agencies add to the collective knowledge? How does it help ministers, agencies, stakeholders and the public understand the functioning and performance of the state sector?
The three purposes for which PIF was set up are to:
• help chief executives drive improvements in agency and crossagency performance; • give ministers, stakeholders, and the public assurance about current levels of agency and system performance, and progress on improving both; and • give central agencies a coherent view of agency and system performance and position central agencies to prioritise and drive improvements.
(State Services Commission, 2011b) The PIF system analysis plays a part in all three purposes, but primarily, in the last one. Some early results of this analysis will be discussed below, but first some technical limits and pitfalls of the analysis need to be recognised. First, a PIF agency review is not an audit, scientific evaluation, an investigation of compliance or an accreditation process. Rather, it is an integrated, deep, fast and independent review of an agency's fitness for purpose and indicates how well placed that agency is to deal with the issues that confront it in the near future. Moreover, the report is published, as are all on the State Services Commission website. The method of enquiry is mixed. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are used, often in combination with desktop analysis and one-on-one interviews and focus groups which use the methods of appreciative enquiry and strengths-based analysis (State Services Commission, 2012a) -these are focused on internally-driven organisational learning. PIF also has the advantage of integrating publicly-available performance information and internal management information from the State Services Commission, the Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (State Services Commission, 2012b) . Finally, the reviews themselves rely on a peer review, and the ratings are a set of judgements about an agreed, though unknown, future state. In that respect, the PIF process is 'heuristic ' (Ryan, 2004) , one through which agencies learn their way forward through collective dialogue and internal reflection.
After being redesigned over the past 12 months, PIF is now a method for systematically identifying the extent to which an agency understands its role and purpose and determining how it is led, managed and resourced Second, because each PIF agency review is contextually relevant to that agency and the particular challenges the agency faces, the ratings cannot be regarded as easily or productively comparable. Simple, standardised indicators, therefore, do not apply. The State Services Commission is emphatic on this point: it is not possible to benchmark with PIF in the same way that common indicators are used in the Better Administrative and Support Services (BASS) process (State Services Commission, 2012c).
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The ratings recorded for any aspect of agency performance represent a collective judgement constructed and moderated in the course of the process by a group of actors (particularly the lead reviewers, but also chief executives and central agency officials) who collaborate across several reviews using a complex framework of shared criteria (performance expectations and standards) applied consistently across different organisational settings.
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These judgements are broadly relational between agencies but not strictly comparable. Ascribing scores to those judgements is useful but also problematic. Conversion into simple numerics dilutes the most important aspect of the PIF process: the narrative through time of organisational learning and development. Nonetheless, scores do give a sense of spread and tendency across the state services at a particular point in time, and provide a sharp focus for the PIF system analysis, even if they do not tell the whole story. The results of the overall system analysis, therefore, should be read as indicative and relative rather than definitive and absolute. They provide some understanding of those things done well by agencies, and, at the other end of the scale, those areas where performance improvement is required.
The third caution relates to the fact that PIF and the system analysis are works in progress. The system analysis to date is based on the 21 reviews so far completed. The picture so far of overall system performance may change as new reviews are completed. Indeed, if learning across the sector is to be continuous, recursive and emergent, the overall picture will change as the reviews are completed.
The PIF system analysis is proceeding with these limitations in mind. The commentary and ratings from each of the reviews conducted so far have been collated and analysed, looking for known challenges as a whole and for particular sectors, examples of strong performance on which to build, and further challenges arising across the system. We emphasise that system analysis of this type is not about identifying poor performers and telling them how they could improve. Individual reports and agency responses are only one set of tools for building performance improvement into agency strategic planning. Follow-up reviews provide a check on progress and advice on next steps. System analysis is about identifying the areas where improvement is required or that provide a base for improvement elsewhere, looking for the themes that explain the ratings and offer a starting point for improvement actions, and tracking how the capability and performance of the system improve over time.
What do the findings suggest?
Early system analysis findings were reported in a May 2011 Cabinet paper available on the SSC website.
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A condensed version combined with central agency responses, as subsequently presented to the Better Public Services Advisory Group, is shown in Table 1 .
The May 2011 analysis was based on a mixture of text and, mostly, ratings. In order to focus on what forwardlooking action could be taken across the system, that analysis has been updated. A condensed version of that update is shown in Table 2 . It is important, too, that this subsequent analysis focuses on why a dimension is important. The focus is on strong or well-placed practice: thus the combined percentage of these ratings is detailed. Further, 21 reports are covered, whereas the initial May 2011 analysis covered only 10 reports. The analysis is also informed by the Better Public Services Advisory Group Report, and the known challenges the advisory group evidenced or started to reveal.
Combining the matters revealed in dimensions one and two, one of the most obvious findings is that agencies do what the government of the day wants, but sustained delivery and strategic building for the future continues to be rare. A need for greater system 'stewardship'.
People management needs improvement, ranging from communicating vision to developing appropriate cultures and capability and managing poor performance.
Better leadership required to engage and develop staff.
Allocative efficiency is low: agencies generally cannot track expenditure and impacts in a meaningful fashion, compare cost effectiveness of policy options, or connect such information to how they make decisions; and compliance behaviour dominates recording and use of financial information.
Need a common culture of continuous improvement.
Silos persist, getting in the way of information flow between agencies, and between government and others. This limits the ability to deliver advice to Ministers that recognises risks, policy impacts and cross-government priorities. Agencies with cross-government interests struggle to prioritise and exert influence.
Need outcome-focused governance and accountability, and mechanisms to drive cross-agency priorities.
Contrary to the still-common stereotype of senior leaders in the state services as being like Sir Humphrey Appleby manipulating the minister (in the satirical television series Yes Minister), the reality is the opposite: agencies do very well at implementing the government's priorities, particularly as they relate to defined, fastturnaround, short-to medium-term tasks. However, there are weaknesses in relation to clear multi-year strategies that tie achievement of results to underlying capability, clearly communicated from boardroom or senior management level to the coalface; and in the shaping of planning, daily activities, and external reporting. The first and second performance dimensions together are key areas for stewardship of state services capability and performance, led by the central agencies, and reinforced by progress on setting and tracking performance expectations as well as cross-agency results and medium-term planning. Agencies that perform best in these two dimensions typically have a clearly-defined purpose and relatively well-defined goals that are motivating, unifying and discriminating (that is, in defining direction, setting priorities and enlisting the support of others). They also have an effective engagement with ministers, and use that engagement as a foundation for better-focused policy and delivery within and across agencies. Finally, agencies that do best in these dimensions have an operating model and internal structures to support the results 
Finance and Resources
This dimension is important as these functions should provide the information, intelligence and analysis that forms the basis for decision making that underpins strong agency performance. Superior performance requires that the right information is available to the right people at the right time, and that this information is properly analysed and used. Financial and risk management are critical components and should help management understand and improve operational performance as well as informing strategy formulation, prioritisation and investment decisions. Good risk management is also critical in maintaining confidence in the agency.
52%
Financial Management 81% Asset Management 67% Risk Management 38% Information Management 24%
Provoking Debate and Learning Lessons: it is early days, but what does the Performance Improvement Framework challenge us to think about? that are well-defined and clear on what needs to be done.
The third dimension must be looked at in tandem with the messages emerging from assessments of the effectiveness and efficiency of core businesses. The core business analysis shows a general shortfall in the expected ability to track how resources are being used, what results are being achieved, and what improvements might be possible. Even the relatively strong area of review, where these are often done well, is undermined to some degree by a lack of follow-up on the conclusions reached. This is an area where progress on sector models, benchmarking, improving regulatory practice and other Better Public Services programme work-streams should pay significant dividends, but it will take time. On the positive side, the best agencies in this dimension demonstrate that they value learning, innovation and continuous improvement, and expect and support ongoing improvement and adaption through measurement, testing and review.
Internal leadership is one of the most challenging areas of the results to date. The challenges here are deep, enduring and widespread, and are further linked to the matters identified under the second dimension (strategy and role). Particularly important are the need to improve strong, cohesive and engaging leadership by senior managers, and effective management of both good and poor staff performance. Only a few agencies enjoy strong internal leadership which attracts talented people and inspires them. Others invest in talent. To make any improvements, we believe the central agencies and senior leaders in the state services need to see building strong institutions as our core purpose.
Results through collaboration by agencies also indicate an area of weakness, and have done so consistently. Collaboration is central to effective delivery of the ten result areas, let alone of cross-cutting results in other complex social or economic areas. This includes collaboration with nongovernment parties, whether third-party service providers, stakeholder groups or customers. That said, there is an issue over the definition of collaboration and the real or perceived legal and institutional barriers to achieving it. With progress in clarifying expectations and in steps to reduce the barriers, this area can be expected to show significant improvement in the next cycle of reviews. In the meantime, we note that the bestperforming agencies enlist the active support of all those outside the agency who are necessary to it delivering its key results.
The final dimension -finance and resources -has one of the better stories of the results so far; but, even so, it is a dimension needing great improvement. The public sector has made progress in building basic good practice in financial and asset management which has made New Zealand a world leader in public sector financial reporting. Yet we suggest we need to look beyond that. What is needed is a step up to strategic management of the financial and information infrastructure, to support and enable strategic and operational decision making on what to do and how best to do it. With the standards for financial and asset management being raised to this higher level, agencies will face challenges to even maintain current ratings.
Lesson learned: results and capability are connected
If scores are ascribed to the ratings achieved by agencies in their reviews, 8 and those scores are cross-tabulated across agencies, several lessons become apparent. One is that, as shown in Figure 1 , results and capability are positively connected. There is a general tendency in the distribution towards higher scores in results being associated with organisations that also score higher on capability. The implication of this pattern is to reinforce calls for greater attention to be paid to strategic capability inside state sector organisations. If this is done, results will in turn improve.
Another interesting finding in the data is shown in Figure 2 . The numbers in Figure 2 are calculated by subtracting each agency's aggregate capability score from its aggregate results score. While better capability tends to be associated with stronger results, some agencies produce better results than might be expected from their capability rating, while a few produce lower results than might be expected. Of course, this only holds true if one assumes a starting hypothesis that both capability and results are measured consistently so that a meaningful benchmark can be observed, whether that be results = capability so that 0.00 is the expected score, or the score is the actual average so far of 0.32.
What might this mean? While there may be a general positive relationship between capability and results, other factors may influence how well capability is translated into results. For example, reviewers have often found agencies that attract talented people who are committed to advancing New Zealand's interests, and, where this commitment aligned with government's priorities and goals, those staff produced results despite the agency. It is also possible then some result areas have not been set at an appropriate level: that is, the results are too easy or too hard to achieve, or capability may have been assessed too high or too low. It could also be that the agency is better or worse than expected at converting capability into results due to agency, sector or other specific reasons -for example, at early stages in a transformation process.
Lesson learned: agency size does not matter
Using the unique number pair (result: capability), turning it into a ratio and plotting it against number of full-time staff equivalents at the time of the review, Figure 3 shows that the range of agency performance is consistently wide across results and capability. This invites a conclusion that size does not matter: that organisations both large and small can be capable and effective in achieving results. High-quality management of the available 
resources within an organisation may be more important than the quantum of people resources available.
Lesson learned: purpose, vision and strategy do matter
Once again, the PIF system analysis confirms an obvious lesson. As shown in Figure 4 , there is a positive association between agency rankings as applied by the PIF reviewers and the extent to which each organisation also scored high in clarity of vision and appropriate structures and roles. Overall, these are the matters included in the strategy and role grouping in Table 2 . In other words, as the classic models of strategic management have suggested for more than 30 years, where organisations define their vision, goals and objectives and create structures and roles that align with them, they perform better in achieving desired results for government.
Lesson learned: efficiency continues to elude us
While the New Zealand public management system is better for many of the changes flowing from the new focus arising from the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 -followed by the State Sector Act 1988, the Public Finance Act 1989 and other legislation, concluding with the Crown Entities Act in 2004 -an improved ability to measure efficiency is not one of them. Figure 5 summarises the problem. Efficiency suffers from problems in outcome and output definitions. Agencies generally lack data to make efficiency improvements, and do not treat enhancing efficiency as a core business driver but more as a one-off, externally-driven exercise. The strongest performance tends to be in large operational agencies, but even here some lead reviewers expressed concern about a focus on one-off exercises at the possible expense of efficiency as business-as-usual, and wide variation in practice.
How does PIF system analysis fit with state sector change?
As suggested above, the system analysis strongly supports the areas of performance identified in the Better Public Services programme and the actions being taken to address those areas, as well as helping to identify where there is scope to build on strong performance. The 'four-year excellence horizon' also reinforces the increasing medium-term focus across state services planning and reporting -from the four-year budget plans and workforce strategies, to longterm regulatory plans and the two-yearly regulatory best-practice assessments. It is no longer enough, if it ever was, to deliver on the current year's performance targets. Rather, it is now about how an agency delivers over the next several years, what capability that will require, and how an agency can ensure it is in place.
An increased emphasis is also being placed on benchmarking of performance, backed up by clearly-defined performance metrics and external scrutiny. These PIF results can be combined with a growing database of other information, such as BASS, policy advice benchmarking, asset maturity model assessments, audit results, best practice regulation assessments, among others. Such wholeof-system assessments, integrated with agency-specific data, should allow a detailed 'dashboard' analysis of individual agency performance and of how it can be improved -supporting efforts to address policy and delivery challenges -and cross-agency identification of common challenges and solutions. Thus, the PIF is part of a shift to a more explicit standard of defining and tracking performance, changing the nature of incentives in the public sector, boosting the role that the corporate centre can play, and enhancing the ability for stakeholders and the public to scrutinise what they are getting for their tax dollars.
Critical Areas Element
Conclusion
There are a number of big crosscutting issues that have eluded previous governments, addressing them will require a sustained public and private effort to address. 
FUTURE STATE
Directions for Public Management in New Zealand
Edited by Bill Ryan & Derek Gill
New Zealand's public sector has consistently rated well internationally on a variety of measures of comparative government performance. In the 1980s New Zealand achieved a step change in public sector reform when it introduced a distinctive and widely applauded model of public management. Despite attempts at continuing improvement, however, New Zealand has struggled over the past decade to keep developing the frameworks and tools that public managers require to manage efficiently and effectively in the public sector. New Zealanders are becoming more diverse in their needs, ethnicities and lifestyles, and more demanding their expectations, and the weight of these expectations increasingly impacts on government. In the face of these changing circumstances, it is tempting to stick with the current model and continue to refine and adjust it. But tweaking is no longer enoughanother step change is required.
In 2001 the chief executives of several public sector organisations commissioned a group of researchers associated with the School of Government at Victoria University of Wellington to undertake a project looking at the 'future state' -to consider present trends that would impact on public management in coming years. Future State pulls together the results of the work, covering emerging trends in governance, from both New Zealand and international perspectives: issues, options and policy implications of shared accountability; experimentation and learning in policy implementation; agency restructuring; skills and capability; the authorising environment; and e-government. It contains valuable insights into how New Zealand's public sector currently operates, and how it might operate in the future. 
